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Abstract
Solutions to the coalition formation problem 
commonly assume agent rationality and, correspondingly, 
utility maximization. This in turn may prevent agents from 
making compromises. As shown in recent studies, 
compromise may facilitate coalition formation and 
increase agent utilities. In this study we leverage on those 
new results. We devise a novel coalition formation 
mechanism that enhances compromise. Our mechanism 
can utilize information on task dependencies to reduce 
formation complexity. Further, it works well with both 
cardinal and ordinal task values.  Via experiments we 
show that the use of the suggested compromise-based 
coalition formation mechanism provides significant 
savings in the computation and communication 
complexity of coalition formation. Our results also show 
that when information on task dependencies is used, the 
complexity of coalition formation is further reduced. We 
demonstrate successful use of the mechanism for 
collaborative information filtering, where agents combine 
linguistic rules to analyze documents' contents.
1  Introduction
Coalition formation mechanisms are often used as a 
means for agent coordination. Coalition formation is 
necessary when agents need to perform tasks which they 
cannot carry out efficiently alone. Several coalition 
formation models have been suggested to date (e.g. 
[5,6,7]), based on various assumptions. Recently, a 
solution that suggests that agents compromise their gains 
to promote coalition formation was suggested [3]. In this 
article, we address the coalition formation problem and 
suggest compromise too. However, prior work assumes 
that the value at which compromise is beneficial is 
known, or can be arrived at experimentally. In many real 
applications where coalitions are necessary, this 
assumption does not hold. In our coalition formation 
mechanism, we do not assume that the optimal 
compromise point is known in advance. Rather, we 
provide agents with means to gradually arrive at an 
agreed compromise via a series of concessions. Such a 
solution is more flexible and more applicable to real 
problems compared to previous solutions. Our coalition 
formation method utilizes dependence relations among 
tasks to guide agent search for coalitions. Searching the 
coalition space based on task combinations serves as a 
means for agents to arrive at compromise. Our approach, 
in difference from other coalition formation solutions, 
suggests that agents first attempt to reduce conflicts 
amongst themselves, and only then form the coalition. 
Conflict reduction in turn reduces negotiation time 
between agents, as our experimental evaluation explicitly 
shows. In addition, our solution considers the complex 
relationships among tasks in the search for coalitions. 
Such use of task complexity to improve the coalition 
formation is not present in other solutions, as task 
relationships are seldom considered. 
Several reasons accredit the use of task structure 
analysis for coalition search in the multi-agent system. 
The presence of task relationships, for instance 
dependencies between tasks, introduces a certain form of 
dependence between the agents which will perform them. 
Consequently, dependencies between the coalitions 
formed by the agents may arise. When these dependencies 
exist, it would be preferable that agents identify them in 
advance, as such knowledge can promote compromise 
and simplify coalition formation. Thus, it should be 
advantageous to manage dependencies between tasks 
prior to their assignment to agents. This implies that 
agents must reason about the tasks they will perform prior 
to making a decision on the coalitions they join. 
Dependencies between tasks can be revealed prior to 
coalition formation via search. Leaving dependencies 
between tasks unidentified does not avoid conflicts, it 
merely postpones their resolution. When conflict 
resolution is postponed to a late stage of the coalition 
formation process, agents might form coalitions that they 
will need to break when conflicts are found, thus require 
further negotiation and re-formation. 
Another significant reason for searching the coalition 
space based on task dependencies is the reciprocal interest 
of the agents. For instance, an agent A may take part in 
the execution of a task T; task T may be of significance 
for another agent B; Agent A might need B's support in 
future tasks. If A and B know this in advance, they are 
motivated to be more cooperative, and in turn apply 
compromise regarding the execution of T and other tasks. 
In this article we illustrate the method we propose in 
the context of a European project. The project provides a 
multilingual system for the analysis and detection of racist 
and revisionist content on the Internet. In this application 
domain, agents are used to dynamically combine 
linguistic rules for document analysis. Agents, each 
implementing a linguistic rule, form coalitions. The 
coalition formation method consists of clustering tasks 
into task partitions based on relationships identified 
among the tasks. Task relationships we consider include 
dependence, similarity, covering, etc. Task clustering 
simplifies coalition formation and consequently reduces 
the negotiation time between agents. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the coalition formation problem and the 
document filtering application context for which we solve 
it. In section 3, we present the concepts of the coalition 
formation model, first the principles of this model, then 
the behaviors of the agents in the model. Section 4 
presents the results of the experiments carried out. We 
then conclude and discuss future work in section 5.
2  The problem
In this section we formally define the coalition formation 
problem we solve and describe the context of the solution. 
2.1 Problem description 
Consider a set of agents C = {C1, C2, ... ,Cn} and a set 
of tasks T = {T1, T2, ... ,Tm}. The agents in C need to 
execute the tasks in T and can negotiate over their 
execution. Several relationships are defined on T. Tasks in 
T can be combined into sets of tasks, and negotiation can 
be performed over such sets. Each agent in C has its own 
utility function that it tries to maximize. The goal of an 
agent is to determine the coalitions to which it should 
belong and the tasks or task sets to perform in these 
coalitions, such that its utility is maximized.
2.2 Application context 
The application addressed in this study concerns web 
document filtering. The tracking of racist documents on 
the Internet faces a number of obstacles, which make it 
impossible to rely only on the classical keyword-based 
approach, neural network techniques, etc. [1,4] Racist 
discourse spans from hate speech to more subtle 
insinuations, with different themes: racist, revisionist, 
anti-semitic, etc. Different genres are used in these 
documents pseudo-scientific articles, pamphlets, etc. 
From the analysis of large sets of racist, anti-racist and 
non-racist documents, a number of criteria for identifying 
racist content have been identified by the teams of 
linguists working on the project: (1) Unique racial 
expressions used only by racist people, for example 
“Rahowa” standing for “Racial Holy War”; (2) Average 
frequencies of certain words in racist documents differ 
from their average in general documents. These words are 
not necessarily racist ones but more common words (like 
“their” or “white”); (3) Combined frequencies of certain 
word pairs are relevant, e.g. the combination of “our” 
with “civilization”, “race” or “religion”; (4) Suffixes like 
“al”, “ence”, “ism” are good indicators for separating 
racist and anti-racist documents. 
One difficulty of the document filtering system we try 
to build is that a single criterion is not sufficient for 
indicating racism; convergence of several criteria is 
required for such indication; however, this indication may 
be valid only provided that there are no concomitant 
indications of anti-racism. Hence the number of criteria 
(several thousands), their correlations and relative 
relevance, increase the overall complexity. To address 
this problem, we introduce a solution based on the use of 
a multi-agent system. In particular, we employ a coalition 
formation model to support criteria combination for the 
information retrieval and filtering problem at hand.
3  Coalitions of criteria agents
As stated above, the analysis of documents in the 
problem domain addressed here employs multiple 
evaluation criteria. In practice, each document should be 
evaluated based on a combination of several linguistic 
criteria. Since combinations vary across documents, and 
the right combination for each document is not known in 
advance, there is a need for a dynamic, flexible 
mechanism for criteria selection and combination. In this 
work this need is addressed via multi-agent coordination. 
We introduce a set of criteria agents, each representing a 
single linguistic criterion, and provide them with a 
dynamic coordination mechanism – coalition formation –
to address the criteria combination problem. Following, 
we present the coalition formation model used by the 
criteria agents. Each agent, given a document, has to 
produce a set of characteristics of that document, using 
both its own processing methods and information 
produced by other criteria agents. To this end, the 
important contribution of our work is in the collaborative 
use of information produced by multiple agents. This 
collaboration improves the quality of document and site 
classification compared to results achieved without such 
collaboration.  
3.1 Model preliminaries 
Based on a single criterion, an agent cannot 
individually provide a definitive judgment on a document. 
Hence, agents must dynamically join together to produce 
definitive judgments. In our solution, this is achieved by 
agents forming coalitions to analyze documents. A 
coalition is a temporary association between agents to 
reach joint goals. For the application domain addressed 
here, the purpose of a coalition of agents is to categorize a 
document as racist, revisionist, anti-racist, etc. 
The details of a coalition formation protocol depend 
on the type of problem studied. For instance, varying trust 
relations or agents' objectives, might require different 
protocols. To enable the agents to form coalitions, most 
current protocols (an exception is found in [2,3]) assume 
that the utility functions of agents, which measure their 
degree of satisfaction with each suggested solution, must 
be comparable or the same. This means that agents must 
be able to agree (for each task or task combination) on a 
common utility function. This assumption is acceptable 
for many multi-agent systems, in particular for economic 
cases where utilities can often be calculated in terms of 
profit. However, in many cases comparing the utilities of 
agents, and even more so their aggregation, is nontrivial. 
The numerical measurement of the utility of an agent is 
already a strong assumption for itself.
In this work we propose a new coalition formation 
model which does not require aggregation of agent 
preferences and utilities. This model does not force the 
agents to follow a particular order while participating in 
the coalition formation process; it guaranties an equitable 
processing of agents' choices. The protocol suggested is 
particularly suitable for problems with complex tasks 
(where there is a need for several agents and for 
coalitions) and for dynamic scenaria where tasks may be 
added and others cancelled or modified, and where the 
agents have different utility functions. Agents are self-
interested, i.e. they do not necessarily trust each other. 
However they respect all the commitments to which they 
agreed. We assume that the utility functions of the agents 
are not known by the other agents and do not need to be 
cardinal, an ordinal utility is enough. 
Our mechanism starts with each agent building partial 
solutions which better account for its preferences. 
Individual partial solutions are then merged by agents, a 
process in which agents make concessions. A complete 
solution may eventually be arrived at by a group of 
agents, thus a coalition is formed. In this model agents 
seek gradual and reciprocal concessions. Without 
concessions, solutions will not be reached and the agents 
will not reach their objectives. The concessions are made 
gradually. Step by step, each agent is asked to make a 
compromise that will set its preferences closer to the 
others'. We re-emphasize here that making concessions is 
a rational behavior (as suggested in [3]), as it increases 
the expected utility of the conceding agent. In the 
example problem domain we study, the criteria agents 
should make concessions regarding the documents to 
which they will be applied first. At the first stage of their 
processing, these agents draw a list of documents they 
prefer to analyze and give them an order of priority. At 
the coalition formation stage, agents should modify their 
preferences regarding either the documents to be analyzed 
or their priorities. Prioritizing is necessary since applying 
all the criteria to a document is infeasible, as there are 
thousands of criteria which could be applied.
3.2 Definitions
Before presenting the details of the coalition 
formation protocol and agent behaviors, we introduce 
some definitions. We initially define the concepts on 
which the coalitions and the solutions agents search for 
are based. We proceed with defining various types of 
relationships between tasks.
Definition 1: Coalition. A set of agents that joined 
together to perform a task or a combination of tasks. 
Definition 2: Coalition structure. A set of coalitions 
that, together, can address all of the tasks and task 
combinations to be performed at a given moment. If a 
coalition structure is approved by all agents, it is 
considered a solution. A solution guarantees that all of the 
tasks are executed by the agents. The set of tasks and task 
combinations that the coalitions in the solution will 
perform is called the support of the coalition structure. 
Definition 3: Group of coalition structures. A set of 
coalition structures that each provides a specific agent 
with the same utility. For brevity, it will be referred to as 
a group of structures or simply a group. 
Definition 4: Context. A set of parameters which must be 
stable during a negotiation step.
A context is particularly important in the application 
domain we address, because the locations of documents 
change rapidly. Example context parameters are date and 
time. 
Definition 5: Utility function. Measures the satisfaction 
of the agent with, or its surplus from, its collective and 
individual actions. It is used to represent the preferences 
of the agents. It may be ordinal or cardinal. In our case, 
measuring the utility of a structure of coalitions means 
comparing it with a reference state. The reference state 
will be the same one throughout the negotiation. 
Definition 6: Reference state. In order for the agents to 
know whether they should accept a coalition structure as a 
solution, they need to be able to compare it with their 
minimal guaranteed gain during the negotiation. This 
minimum is the reference state. If there are already 
formed coalitions, the reference is the current coalitional 
state. 
To guarantee a solution after a negotiation, the 
reference state needs to be feasible and identical across all 
of the criteria agents. Otherwise, solutions arrived at by 
different agents might be inconsistent amongst 
themselves.
Definition 7: Acceptable coalition structure. A 
coalition structure is acceptable for an agent if it is 
preferred over, or equivalent, to the current reference 
state.
Definition 8: Signature of a coalition structure Ei, 
denoted Sig(Ei), defines the set of criteria agents that have 
approved this coalition structure.
Definition 9: Knowledge K(Ci) of an agent Ci is the set 
of coalition structures, and the corresponding signatures, 
known to Ci . 
Definition 10: Unacceptable coalition structures: a set of 
coalition structures Out(Ci) for which agent Ci, notifies 
the other agents of it being unacceptable for it. An 
unacceptable coalition structure cannot be proposed as a 
solution by any agent.
The search for the support of a solution considers 
relationships between tasks. Below, we define some types 
of these relationships and provide examples. First, we
introduce the relationships between tasks by considering 
the agents which will perform them; then, we consider 
relationships based on the structure of the tasks.
Definition 11: Total covering. Tasks Ti and Tj are in a 
total covering relationship if the agents selected to carry 
out Ti can also carry out Tj and inversely, and the tasks do 
not conflict (resource conflicts, etc.).
In the case of total covering, tasks Ti and Tj could be 
carried out either sequentially or in parallel, since possible 
conflicts are avoided. 
Definition 12: Inclusive covering. Tasks Ti and Tj are in 
inclusive covering if a subset of the agents selected to 
carry out one of the two tasks can carry out the other.
Definition 13: Partial covering. Tasks Ti and Tj are in 
partial covering if a subset of the agents selected to carry 
out Ti can also carry out a part of Tj and inversely.
Definition 14: Total complementary tasks. Tasks Ti and 
Tj are totally complementary if each of them can reuse the 
results of the other task. 
As an example, consider two documents Di and Dj
indexed by the same site. Based on preliminary 
experiments we performed, we know that, (a) frequently, 
documents found at the same site are similar to one 
another (in the linguistic sense); (b) because of their 
similarity, the results obtained when analyzing Di subject 
to certain criteria, may be applicable to Dj too. For 
instance, computing the frequencies of one or several 
words in a document could be a shared result. This 
introduces a complementary relationship. 
Definition 15: Dependent tasks. Tasks Ti and Tj are 
dependent if only one of the two tasks needs the results of 
the other task to perform its execution. 
The dependence relationship between tasks allows 
grouping of agents based on their shared interests. For 
example, in order to analyze a document Di at a given 
site, several criteria are necessary, among which some 
may be relevant to the analysis of another document Dj at 
the same site. Such criteria sharing may promote the 
formation of a coalition for performing the two analysis 
tasks of Di and Dj.
Definition 16: Competitive tasks. Tasks Ti and Tj are 
competitive if Ti and Tj compute the same indicators using 
different methods. Ti and Tj should not be part of the 
support of a same solution. Recognizing competitive tasks 
makes it possible to prune the solutions search space.
3.3 The coalition formation method
The aim of this method is to solve the agent coalition 
formation problem without having to aggregate the 
preferences of the agents, and to allow a dynamic and fast 
reorganization of these coalitions according to changes in 
the problem domain. The method we propose is based on 
two concurrent behaviors of the agents: task analysis, and 
negotiation. Task analysis consists of grouping of tasks 
into combinations, based on relationships among the 
tasks, where each combination is to be performed by a 
coalition. To simplify and optimize the search among 
those combinations of tasks, a binary tree is constructed, 
and combinations are placed in its nodes. Additionally, 
from each combination of tasks competitive combinations 
(defined below) can be isolated. The advantage of the 
suggested method is in directing the search of the support 
of the solutions towards preferred tasks, thus reducing 
search complexity.
Definition 17: Competitive combination of tasks. Two 
combinations of tasks CT1 and CT2 are competitive for an 
agent ai if its utility from CT1 ,U(ai, CT1), is equal to its 
utility from CT2 , U(ai, CT2), and CT1 and CT2 do not 
belong to the support of the same solution.
Definition 18: Tree of task combinations is constructed 
based on combinations' preference. The preferred 
combination of the agent that constructs the tree is placed 
in the root. The rest of the nodes are populated in a 
descending preference order. Two branches emanate from 
each node N: a positive branch labeled with (+), 
indicating that N is in the support of the solution; a 
negative branch labeled with (-), which indicates that N is 
out of the support of the solution.
The supports of the coalition structures in this tree are 
read starting from the root and by retaining only the nodes 
when branches emanating from them are labeled with a 
positive sign. For instance, in Figure 3 the support S3 is 
only formed of the combinations <{T1, T2, T3}, {T5, T6}> 
since on the path starting from the root to the leaf node S3, 
the node {T4, T5} is negatively labeled on the branch of 
this path. Hence, this node does not belong to the support
S3.
The tree of combinations is incrementally constructed. 
To develop this tree an agent selects the combinations that 
it organized first in partitions. We define a partition of 
task combinations as a set of combinations concerned 
with one task and containing all the combinations where 
this task appears. Each combination of tasks belongs to 
only one partition (cf. Figure 2). 
For instance, consider four agents C1,…,C4, eight tasks 
T1,…,T8 and seven possible coalition structures E0,…,E6, 
where E0 is the initial state. Of these structures, only three 
are Pareto optima (E1, E3 and E6). Let Ui(E) be the utility 
of agent Ci for the coalition structure E. We represent the 
coalition structures in Figure 1 according to the utility that 
they bring to each agent. To build its coalition structures, 
agent C1 computes some task combinations. This is done 
with respect to its preferences. For instance, C1 computes 
the following preferred combinations: {T1, T2, T3}, {T1, 
T2}, {T4, T5}, {T5, T6}, {T3, T4, T5}, {T6, T7} and {T6, T7, 
T8}.
Figure 1. Possible coalition structures in a utility 
space
In this example, these combinations are used to build the 
coalition structure E1 as explained hereafter. To simplify 
the construction of, and the search in, the tree of the 
supports for the solutions, these combinations are first 
classified into several partitions (P1, P2 and P3 in Figure 
2) and ordered in decreasing preference order. The 
preference degree of each partition is computed based on 
the preference degrees of the combinations it includes. 
The first partition p1 has the highest preference degree 
and is thus placed at the top. In building the tree, the 
preferred combination of agent C1 ,{T1, T2, T3}, is attached 
to the root of its tree (cf. Figure 3). Then, the agent 
creates two branches and searches for the next 
combination to be considered. In the positive branch, the 
combination must be selected from a partition other than 
P1, because combinations in p1 share at least the task T1, 
and a support of a coalition structure should have only 
one instance of each task. The agent selects the 
combination {T4, T5} from P2. As for the negative branch, 
the agent selects the combination {T1, T2} from P1. The 
tree is further built in the same manner. For instance, the 
following positive combination is {T6, T7} form P3.
Note that singleton combinations (containing one task) 
are not immediately integrated into the tree. To avoid 
building unnecessarily deeper trees, singletons are 
directly added to the support once formed. Searching the 
tree and selecting the nodes from which positively labeled 
branches emanate gives us already several possible 
supports, for instance, S3. S3 is formed of two 
combinations <{T1, T2, T3}, {T5, T6}>. If among the 
singleton combinations, there are some that the agent 
would like to perform, they are added to the support. E.g., 
if C1 is interested in tasks {T4} and {T7}, S3 becomes <{T1, 
T2, T3}, {T5, T6}, {T4}, {T7}>. 
Once the agent has identified the supports in the tree 
of task combinations, and in particular its most preferred 
coalition structures, it is ready to start the negotiation 
phase. In particular, it will send coalition structures it has 
found as part of coalition formation proposals to peer 
agents. Each agent computes its own tree. Each tree may 
provide several supports of different coalition structures, 
and such supports may vary across trees. This in turn 
allows several different solutions to the coalition 
formation problem, as each task or combination of tasks 
in each support can be allocated to different coalitions of 
agents.
{P1}
{T1, T2, T3}
{T1, T2}
{T4, T5}
{T5, T6}
{T3,T4, T5}
{T6,T7}
{T6,T7, T8}
{P2}
{P3}
Figure 2. Partitions of
 task combinations
     Figure 3. Supports tree 
3.3.1 Initiation of the negotiation. The negotiation 
process we propose is based on three phases: initialization 
of the negotiation and transfer of tasks, the core 
negotiation, and transmission of the solution. There is no 
pre-established order among the agents. Agents can 
initiate negotiation and participate at any time. 
Negotiation may be initiated when new documents to be 
analyzed are sent by the search engines or by a peer 
criterion agent. Each agent asks the other agents to send it 
their tasks, prioritized. Upon such a request, each agent 
computes and sends the vector of its conditional choices. 
We assume that agents are cooperative in this respect. For 
instance, in our application domain, tasks are documents 
to be analyzed. An agent Ci may send a vector, e.g., 
Want(Ci)=(t1:D1D2D3, t2:D4 if Cj├D4 ,:D5). This vector 
indicates that Ci wants to analyze documents D1, D2 or D3 
first (at time t1). It wants to analyze document D4 second 
(at time t2), if the necessary resources are provided by 
agent Cj. It has no demands for document D5. 
After task vectors with preferences are transmitted, 
each agent holds the set of tasks and can compute 
coalitions to be proposed or agreed to. The initiator agent 
computes the preferred combinations of tasks. It 
constructs a tree of supports as described above. Each 
support in this tree will provide a set of coalition 
structures. Indeed, for each task or combination of tasks 
in this support, the initiator agent finds its preferred 
agents which will perform them. The agent then gathers 
these coalition structures in groups in order to initiate the 
negotiation. 
3.3.2 The negotiation model. Once the initiator agent 
computes the coalition structures, it chooses an agent to 
which these coalition structures will be sent (as proposals 
for coalition formation). This choice is based on the 
agent’s strategies. The agent also declares its 
unacceptable coalition structures. The initiator initially 
T1 , T2, T3
T4, T5
T1, T2
T6, T7
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+
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E5
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sends its most preferred coalition structures, signed in 
Sig(Ei); it may iteratively send, in a decreasing order of 
preference, its other coalition structures. This may be 
continued until there are no more coalition structures at 
least equivalent to the current state. However, before 
sending a less preferred coalition structure, the agent may 
wait until it receives a message from another agent either 
about the former coalition structure it has proposed or 
about a new coalition structure proposed by that agent. 
Each of the other agents also computes its preferred 
coalition structures. It then computes the coalition 
structures that it will choose in second position and so on.
When an agent R receives a group of coalition 
structures from a sender agent S, it sorts those coalition 
structures in order of preference into homogeneous new 
groups. In each of these groups, all coalition structures are 
equivalent in terms of utility of S. R updates its 
knowledge on the coalition structures in K(R). When the 
utility of a new group is equivalent to the utility of a 
group which is already known to R, these groups are not 
merged by R, since for S their utility is not the same. R
only sorts coalition structures that are at least equivalent 
to the reference state and the others are not considered. If 
there is at least one coalition structure which is preferable 
or equivalent to R's best choice, it forwards this coalition 
structure CS to the next agent that it wishes to include in 
the negotiation. R signs CS and adds it to Sig(CS). This 
information indicates that CS has been approved by R and 
by all the preceding senders as well. When R finds in the 
set it receives unacceptable coalition structures, it has to 
declare them unacceptable to the other agents in Out(R). 
Out(R) also contains the coalition structures that R itself, 
locally, identified as unacceptable. 
Information on unacceptable structures is useful 
because it prevents the need of other agents computing 
coalition structures that will be systematically refused. 
However, its transmission is expected only when agents 
trust each other. With no trust, agents would not transmit 
this information, to prevent the others from using the 
information in their strategies. For instance, such 
information could enable agents to know which coalition 
structures an agent may accept, thus gaining an advantage 
in negotiation. When a combination of tasks in a support 
of a coalition structure is unacceptable for an agent, it 
should also indicate that. This combination of tasks is 
then deleted from the partitions of tasks to prevent it from 
being considered as part of a support of another coalition 
structure. The tree is also revised in order to erase the 
supports containing this combination of tasks. 
In case that a coalition structure CS is acceptable for 
agent A, but its utility is inferior to its top choice, A may 
nevertheless decide to forward CS to the next agent B. 
Consequently the number of agents having approved CS
grows and CS is thus reinforced. A may also decide to 
temporarily block CS but indicates in K(A) that it has 
received it, if it considers that there is still enough 
negotiating time to reach a consensus. In this case the 
agent sends to B the coalition structures it prefers. 
A possible end point of the negotiation occurs when 
an agent C receives a group of coalition structures 
approved by all other agents. C sorts the coalition 
structures into groups. If at least one of the coalition 
structures is better than, or equivalent to, C's reference 
state, and if negotiation time is about to expire, it can 
consider the suggested structure as its best group. All the 
coalition structures of this group are Pareto optima, so C
can arbitrarily choose one of them as a solution for the 
negotiation. In case that negotiation time has not expired 
and provided that C has some undeclared groups of 
coalition structures, it can continue the negotiation. 
Once the last agent has identified a Pareto optimal 
solution which is approved by all, it sends this coalition 
structure to the other agents, which accept it as the 
solution for the negotiation, as they have already 
confirmed it in Sig(Ei) and are thus committed to it.
3.3.3 Negotiation example. We illustrate the negotiation 
model using the previous example. For simplicity, we 
limit our discussion to two agents, C1 and C2. Agent C1
initiates the negotiation and it builds its tree of 
combinations of tasks. Then C1 generates a set of 
coalition structures it considers acceptable. It then sorts 
them into equivalent groups of coalition structures: 
G1(E6) ; G2(E4;E3) ; G3(E2) ; G4(E0;E1). In each group, 
coalition structures have the same preference (cf. Figure 
4). E5 is not sorted as the reference state (E0) is better. 
Figure 4. Group of coalition structures of agent C1
Groups G1, G2, G3 and G4 are acceptable to agent C1
as they correspond to a state which is as satisfactory as 
the initial reference state, or better. In the same way, 
agent C2 also searches for its preferred acceptable 
coalition structures and sorts them into equivalent groups 
of coalition structures (Figure 5): G’1(E1); G’2(E2;E3);
G’3(E4); G’4(E5); G’5(E0). E6 is not sorted as the reference 
state E0 is better.
Figure 5. Group of coalition structures of agent C2
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Groups G’1, G’2, G’3, G’4 and G’5 are acceptable to 
agent C2 as they correspond to a state which is as
satisfactory as the initial reference state, or better. Thus 
C1 starts by sending its first preferred group G1. Agent C2
starts by receiving G1 and evaluates it (cf. Figure 6). The 
unique coalition structure E6 in G1 is unacceptable for C2
because it leads to a state less satisfactory than the initial 
state. Agent C2 does not send this coalition structure. It 
notifies C1 that it rejects G1(E6). If one or more coalitions 
in the coalition structure E6 is appropriate for C2, it may 
indicate it to C1.
Figure 6. First group received by agent C2
Agent C1 must then wait for a new proposal from 
agent C2. Thus C2 sends its preferred set, i.e. G’1(E1). This 
group contains only coalition structure E1 which is 
acceptable to agent C1 but which corresponds at the same 
time to its least preferred choice. For E1 the utility of C2 is 
the same as that of its reference state E0 (cf. Figure 5). 
Agent C1 does not reject this coalition structure but it still 
has a possibility to propose a new group to agent C2. C1 
thus sends its second preferred group G2(E3; E4).
Figure 7. First group received by agent C1
Agent C2 receives G2 and separates its two coalition 
structures into two groups. E3 of G2 now belongs to its 
group G’2 which corresponds to its second preferred 
group. As for coalition structure E4, it belongs to group 
G’3  its third choice. E3 is acceptable. As all the other 
agents have already participated in the negotiation, agent 
C2 cannot send it to others. Coalition structure E3 of G’2
can thus be a solution. Agent C2 has no other Pareto 
optimal choices left. Either it sends E3 to agent C1 in order 
to indicate to it the final result of the negotiation, or it 
waits until C1 gives way on coalition structure E1 which is 
also Pareto optimal considering the fact that agent C2 has 
already refused one of the coalition structures that agent 
C1 proposed to it. The negotiation between the two agents 
inevitably finishes on one of the two Pareto optima and 
before expiration of the pre-set negotiation time. Note that 
classical game theoretic analysis might bring the two 
agents to an equilibrium where no coalition is formed 
(and both lose). Yet, as shown in [3], and reinforced in 
our work, it is in the best interest of agents, even if they 
are self-interested, to compromise. Implementing a 
compromise strategy, one of these agents will normally 
yield to allow for a solution to be arrived at.
4  Experimental evaluation
To evaluate it, the model suggested in this study was 
implemented and experimented with. The code was 
written in Java and run on a Windows 98 host, 1.4 GHZ 
processor and 256 MB RAM. We initially performed 
experiments on the basis of some dependence 
relationships. In order to evaluate the protocol, we have 
analyzed its performance by observing several 
parameters: the number of exchanged messages, the size 
of these messages (the number of coalition structures they 
contain), the number of coalition structures that have been 
evaluated and the negotiation runtime. The results 
obtained are summarised in the following figures. It 
should be noted that each point in the graphs is the 
average of 10 tests carried out under the same conditions.
Figure 8 shows negotiation runtimes obtained in 
milliseconds with the number of agents varying between 2 
and 10. The negotiation runtime increases in this figure. 
This is due to the higher number of proposals that agents 
would compute and exchange. However the search time 
remains acceptable even when the number of agents 
grows. Figure 9 shows the number of coalition structures
sent by the agents. For instance in our experiments, with 4 
agents and 4 documents, 18 coalition structures were 
transmitted, and for 10 agents with 10 documents, only 
5058 coalition structures have been sent, compared to 
45927 coalition structures expected in a case where 
dependencies are not considered (the latter was computed 
offline). The number of messages sent varies considerably 
according to the incompatibility of the preferences of the 
agents. 
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Figure 10 shows the number of evaluated coalition
structures and allows measuring the effectiveness of the 
search when handling of dependence relationships is 
employed. Had agents not considered dependencies, for 
instance in the case of 4 agents and 4 tasks, the number of 
coalition structures they should have evaluated would 
have been 6561. As the graph shows, the actual number is 
by far smaller. This holds for larger numbers of agents 
too: 10 agents have only examined 8983 coalition 
structures, compared to 45927 possible ones when 
dependencies are not handled. 
Figure 10: Number of  evaluat ed coalit ion st ructures during a negot iat ion
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To evaluate the gains from the use of task 
dependencies as part of the coalition formation process, 
we performed two experiments where in each the same 
tasks were provided to the agents, however in one 
experiment they used task dependencies and in the other 
they did not. Comparative results between these two 
experiments are presented in Figure 11. As seen there, the 
gains of coalition formation with the handling of task 
dependencies are, on average, about 13% higher than the 
gains without it. This gain in computation results from 
task combinations that are facilitated by task 
dependencies. By using task combinations, the agents 
reduce the number of coalitions they need to consider. 
For instance, without the use of the combinations, an 
agent that has 4 tasks must examine the 4 corresponding 
coalitions. But with task combinations, for the same 4 
tasks, the number of coalitions may decrease. E.g., if the 
tasks are gathered in two task combinations, the agent will 
have to examine only 2 corresponding coalitions. 
Figure 11: Total number of evaluated coalitions with and without 
handling dependencies
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Note that although the results presented here refer to 
10 agents, we have performed additional experiments in 
larger systems, exceeding 50 agents. The subset presented 
is merely aimed at providing the essence of the results.
5  Conclusion
Classical solutions to the coalition formation problem 
assume cardinal ordering of task values. Additionally, it is 
commonly assumed that agents behavior rationally, and 
should thus not compromise their utility. Further, existing 
solutions hardly analyze complex task dependencies. 
Recently, it was shown [3] that compromise strategies in 
coalition formation may dominate other strategies. In this 
study we leverage on this new result. We advocate that, 
for some problem domains, compromise is necessary not 
only to facilitate the formation of coalitions; it is also 
necessary to reduce the complexity of coalition formation. 
We further claim that task dependencies can by utilized to 
prune the coalition formation search space. As we show in 
our experiments, the use of the compromise-based 
coalition formation model we present provides significant 
savings in the computation and communication 
complexity of coalition formation. Our results also show 
that when information on task dependencies is used, the 
complexity of coalition formation is further reduced. 
This study should be extended to address several issues. 
Firstly, the sizes of the systems examined were relatively 
small. Since in our experiments we observed a steep 
growth in computational costs, scale-up of the proposed 
mechanism may face difficulties, in spite of it performing 
much better than a naïve approach. Secondly, the 
mechanism should be check in other domains. Although it 
was specifically designed, and proved successful, for 
tracking racist documents, it is desirable to prove it 
applicable to other domains. In future work we intend to 
pursue these directions. The current results are already 
very promising, as were able to utilize a MAS technique –
coalition formation – for solving an important real-world 
problem.
References 
[1] Cardie, C. Empirical Methods in Information 
Extraction, AI Magazine, 18(4):65-80, 1997.
[2] Kraus, S., Shehory, O., Tasse, G. Coalition Formation 
with Uncertain Heterogeneous Information, AAMAS, 
1-8, 2003.
[3] Kraus, S., Shehory, O., Tasse, G., The Advantages of 
Compromising in Coalition Formation with 
Incomplete Information, AAMAS, 588-595 2004.
[4] Letsche, T. Berry, M.W. Large-scale Information 
Retrieval with Latent Semantic Indexing. Information 
Sciences, 100:105–137, 1997.
[5] Sandholm T.W., Lesser V.R. Coalitions among 
Computationally Bounded Agents, AI, 99-137, 1997.
[6] Sandholm T.W., Larson K., Andersson M., Shehory
O., Tohmé F. Coalition Structure Generation with 
Worst Case Guarantees, Artificial Intelligence, 111, 
209-238, 1999.
[7] Shehory O, Kraus S. Methods for Task Allocation via 
Agent Coalition Formation, AI, 165-200, 1998.
